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This article considers Charles Peirce’s classification of the sciences from shortly after the turn of the 20th 
century. The classification has two main sources of inspiration: Comte’s science classification and Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy. Peirce’s classification is hierarchically organised in that the more general sciences 
provide principles for the less general sciences. Peirce assigns a superordinate role to philosophical 
disciplines which provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for the specialised sciences, 
and which are based on everyday life experience. His most basic philosophical discipline, 
phenomenology, transforms his early engagement with Kant and analyses three categories taken to be 
universal in all human experience and which inform several of the divisions in his science classification.  
Peirce recognises two main branches of specialised empirical science: the natural sciences, on the one 
hand, and the social science, the humanities and psychology, on the other. Taking Peirce’s account of 
scientific development into consideration this article argues that his science classification and its 
emphasis on the interdependencies between the sciences would support interdisciplinarity and 




1.0 Biographical and intellectual context and sources of inspiration 
Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914)1 was the founder of philosophical pragmatism and a pioneer in the 
development of formal logic.2 He was educated both as a philosopher and as a natural scientist, and he 
was well-informed about developments in several disciplines. Both his philosophical pragmatism, which 
is concerned with the connections between knowledge and action,3 and his familiarity with several fields 
of scientific research, inform and guide his elaborate classification of the sciences from shortly after the 
turn of the 20th century.4 Notably, his pragmatism is reflected in his efforts to understand science as ‘a 
pursuit of living men’ (CP 1.232) and a ‘living historic entity’ (CP 1.44), rather than as ‘a mere abstract 
definition’ (CP 1.232) or as ‘systematized knowledge on the shelves’ (CP 1.234). One overall aim of his 
classification was thus to take account of actual developments in the natural sciences, but also in the 
social sciences, psychology and the humanities. Across fields of research he saw processes of 
specialisation as a defining trait of modern science. In concrete sociological terms, he identified the 
results of these processes of specialisation by consulting ‘the list of scientific periodicals and the list of 
scientific societies’ (CP 1.237). Besides his studies of scientific developments, however, his classification 
of the sciences had philosophical sources of inspiration. The two perhaps most imporant sources were 
Auguste Comte’s influential classification of the sciences and Immanuel Kant’s theoretical philosophy. 
Peirce’s classification shares with that of Comte, the father of positivism, that it reflects historical 
developments in both natural and social science. In fact, Peirce even notes particular developments in 
the humanities, such as his perception that ‘[li]nguistics is becoming more and more nomological’ (EP2: 
39), or oriented toward discovering general laws. Yet, like Comte’s hierarchical classification, Peirce is 
concerned with the unity of the sciences. In particular, from Comte’s classification Peirce takes the idea 
of an order of unilateral dependency between the sciences: the more general sciences provide principles 
for the more particular and specialised sciences, not vice versa (EP2: 35, EP2: 258). In particular, Peirce, 
too, takes mathematics to be the most general science upon which all other sciences depend. Hence, his 
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classification, like that of the originator of positivism, is hierarchically organized. Nevertheless, Peirce’s 
classification diverts from that of Comte in several ways. While acknowledging with Comte the crucial 
importance of mathematics for the development of modern natural science, Peirce does not take 
mathematics to be a positive science. Mathematicians do not purport to make assertions about positive 
facts, Peirce says, they rather develop hypotheses about purely imagined possibilities and draw 
consequences from them.5 Moreover, among the specialised empirical sciences, Peirce’s introduces a 
general division between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, psychology and 
the humanities, on the other. He thus recognizes variability and diversity between scientific subject 
matters and objects of knowledge in ways not found in Comte’s positivism, nor in logical positivism in 
the 20th century. More saliently, however, while metaphysics or philosophy generally is absent from 
Comte’s classification, Peirce assigns to philosophy the status of the most general positive science. 
Drawing also on his own work in formal logic, he assigns a key role to philosophy in providing logical, 
methodological and ontological principles for all specialised empirical sciences.  
The role of philosophy in Peirce’s classification should be seen against the background of his 
Kantian legacy and as inspired in particular by Kant’s idea of the ‘architectonic’ character of building 
philosophical systems in the Critique of Pure Reason (CP 1.176).6 Already the early Peirce develops a 
classification of philosophical disciplines based on an epistemological analysis strongly influenced by 
Kant’s first Critique. Later, in the 1890s, he reinvigorates and develops this classification in efforts to 
provide a philosophical and non-psychologistic basis for formal logic.7 This classification serves as a 
starting point for his far more comprehensive science classification from around the turn of the century. 
Yet, there is also a more direct route from his early study of Kant to his later comprehensive 
classification. While the young Peirce endeavored to develop Kant’s transcendental analysis of the 
categories of the understanding (Verstand),8 his later work in mathematical logic leads him to derive 
categories formally from mathematics, and then to assign to philosophy the task of exploring and 
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specifying the content of these categories through experience.9 As I return to below, these categories, 
which the later Peirce names “firstness”, “secondness”, and “thirdness”, inform several divisions of his 
comprehensive science classification. Yet, through his later category analysis, he transforms his early 
Kantian conception of philosophy. As a general and positive science, philosophy considers experiential 
phenomena in an everyday life sense, without using specialised methods or drawing on results from 
specialised scientific inquiries. In Peirce’s own terms, it ‘contents itself with observations such as come 
within the range of every man’s normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his 
life’ (EP2: 146). In an era of incessant scientific specialisation, Peirce thus gives pride of place to 
phenomena of everyday life as objects of philosophical study, decades before Edmund Husserl turned 
phenomenology toward the pre-scientific life world (1970). In Peirce’s classification, philosophy uncovers 
a shared experiential basis for all scientific specialisation and to which specialised researchers may need 
to take recourse in clarifying and reinterpreting scientific concepts and theories.10  
With Peirce’s sources of inspiration in mind, I now take a closer look, firstly, at the elements and 
formal architecture of his classification of the sciences. Secondly, I consider the categories lying at the 










2.0 The structure and elements of Peirce’s classification  
In his classification Peirce introduces a general tripartite division between science of discovery, which 
includes the sciences mentioned above; science of review, which encompasses any science classification, 
as well as history of science (EP2: 258–259, 458); and practical science or science ‘for the uses of life’ (CP 
1.239), for example, ‘pedagogics, … vulgar arithmetic, horology, surveying, navigation, … librarian’s work’ 
(CP 1.243).11 Although Peirce’s classification focuses mostly on a classification of sciences of the first 
branch, the fact that the two last branches are included may give pause to reflect on their significance 
for the classification as a whole.  
Through including science of review, Peirce may be seen to reflexively recognise that a science 
classification is itself a scientific activity of a certain kind. Yet, while this kind of scientific activity is 
empirically constrained by its objects – historically evolving disciplines – its more general distinctions and 
divisions cannot be established simply by describing and labelling given scientific journals or societies. 
Since all classification, on Peirce’s account, ‘is the arrangement of objects according to ideas’ (CP 1.231), 
a science classification would need to develop general classificatory ideas by framing and testing 
conjectures, just like any other scientific activity.12 This calls for further reflexivity and caution in 
conceptualising the general divisions of the science classification, such as the division involving science of 
review itself and the other two branches of science mentioned above.  
In fact, Peirce’s division between science of discovery and practical science might seem to be a bit 
too straight forward, given his more pragmatist qualifications of scientific activity. For example, in 
reflecting on the extensive social and practical consequences of modern science, Peirce recognises how 
science has transformed our everyday world ‘with its microscopes and telescopes, with its chemistry and 
electricity, and with its entirely new appliances of life, … almost as much as if it had transported our race 
to another planet’ (CP 5.513). Given that not only technological products and services, but technological 
research infrastructures and scientific knowledge, started to leave laboratories and academic institutions 
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in young industrial America, a division between pure and practical science becomes increasingly difficult 
to draw. Another consideration to the same effect comes from observing genealogical conditions of 
science. Peirce notes how sciences ‘have grown out of the useful arts’ (CP 1.226). For example, he points 
out that ‘[t]he steam engine made mechanical precision possible and needful’ and that ‘[m]echanical 
precision rendered modern observational precision possible, and developed it’ (EP2: 38–39). From this 
genealogical perspective, too, and given Peirce’s commitment to account for science as a ‘living historic 
entity’ (CP 1.44), a demarcation line between purely scientific and practical disciplines is not ready made 
and would need to be decided more carefully in each case.  
As mentioned, the main thrust of Peirce’s classification concerns divisions within science of 
discovery. Again, the main division is tripartite: mathematics, philosophy, and specialised empirical 
science. While this division may as such seem little controversial, Peirce construes and conceptualises 
relationships of dependence between the sciences, and he assigns distinct roles to mathematics and 
philosophy. Notably, Peirce’s view that philosophy would need to draw on mathematics while 
mathematics needs no foundation in logic (which for Peirce is a philosophical discipline), contrasts 
sharply with the logicist views of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell (1910–1913), and the 
logicism of the Vienna Circle of logical positivism.13 Moreover, the way in which Peirce assigns a certain 
foundational role to philosophy is peculiarly his own. Through its various sub-divisions, he points out, 
philosophy is to provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for specialised empirical 
disciplines. Yet, by drawing on everyday life experience, as well as on conceptual resources from 
mathematics, philosophy itself becomes a positive and in principle fallible science. In fact, Peirce invents 
and calls his most basic philosophical discipline “phenomenology”, which is to explore the three 
categories that we consider more closely in the next section. Despite the name chosen, Peirce’s idea of 
this discipline is not historically related to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Still, Peirce’s stress on the 
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need to develop a distinct philosophical and experiential inquiry, independent of specialised science and 
psychology in particular,14 suggests certain parallels to Husserl. 
Another novelty in Peirce’s classification comes with the further sub-divisions of philosophy into 
normative science and metaphysics. Normative science consists of three philosophical disciplines that 
are hierarchically ordered: aesthetics, ethics, and logic. This subdivision shows another pragmatist aspect 
of his classification. He makes logic, as the science of ‘self-controlled, or deliberate, thought’, dependent 
on ethics, which concerns ‘self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct’ (EP2: 160). Ethics, which distinguishes 
right from wrong, must in turn ‘appeal to esthetics for aid in determining the summum bonum’ (EP2: 
160), since aesthetics, the most basic normative science, studies the very ‘admirableness of an ideal’ 
(EP2: 142). In construing logical reasoning on the model of self-controlled moral conduct, Peirce takes 
the reasoner to be guided by an overarching ideal (the truth) and by general patterns or ‘norms’ of right 
reasoning that are applicable in particular cases (1.606). Despite his pragmatist construal of reasoning, 
however, he distinguishes the normative sciences generally as theoretical sciences and qualifies ethics in 
particular as a theoretical inquiry into ‘what the fitness of an ideal of conduct consists in’ (CP 1.600). The 
normative sciences are thus distinguished from the practical sciences, which are not treated as ‘integrant 
parts’ of the normative sciences as such (EP2: 198) but which are rather concerned with the conformity 
of action to a ‘given particular ideal’ (CP 1.573). Nevertheless, the inclusion of the normative sciences in 
the overall classification still suggests that they could or even should be linked to the practical sciences. 
In fact, Peirce considers how practical sciences ‘may be probably expected to receive aid from [the 
Normative Sciences]’ (EP2: 198), and he comments in particular that the exclusion of ethics from the 
practical sciences of ‘diplomacy and economics is immense folly’ (CP 1.251). These suggested links to 
practical life might recall Comte’s classification and positivism generally, which is closely connected to 
ideas of moral progress and social reform.15 Yet, since such links come through philosophy, not sociology, 
as in Comte’s classification, they would involve a more distanced and no direct commitment to social 
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intervention. Notably, however, Peirce does propose a certain extended and critical application of his 
normative sciences to our inherited moral beliefs and their applicability to a modern technological 
society.16  
In Peirce’s classification, logic is not only conceived as a normative but as a semiotic science 
further divided into three sub-disciplines. Speculative grammar is “the general theory of the nature and 
meaning of signs” (EP2: 260); logical critic concerns the validity of arguments in the formal sense; and 
methodeutic or speculative rhetoric considers methodological principles for specialized scientific 
inquiries but also suggests principles for science communication and scientific writing.17 Peirce’s semiotic 
account of logic clearly differs from a purely formal approach in insisting on the requirement of studying 
the nature of signs in general, and the everyday use of linguistic signs in particular, priori to developing 
and using a formal logical system.18  
As his last philosophical science, in addition to phenomenology and the normative sciences, 
Peirce introduces metaphysics. In its present condition, he admits, metaphysics is only ‘a puny, rickety, 
and scrofulous science’ (EP2: 375). Yet, there is need, he thinks, for a general metaphysics which ‘seeks 
to give an account of the universe of mind and matter’ (EP2: 259). Moreover, intimately linked to this 
philosophical science are two subordinated ‘nomological’ sciences that specify ontological principles for 
two branches of specialised science of dicovery: one the one hand, the natural sciences (or what Peirce 
generally calls ‘physical sciences’); on the other hand, the social sciences, humanities and psychology (or 
what he  generally calls ‘psychical sciences’).19 Adopting an Aristotelian distinction, Peirce’s nomological 
sciences distinguish efficient causation as the underlying principle of the natural sciences, and final 
causation as the principle of the social sciences, the humanities and psychology.20 As for the classificaton 
of psychology in particular, we may note that Peirce was greatly impressed by the new experimental 
psychology of Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Wundt, and that he even conducted pioneering research in 
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this new field.21 Nevertheless, he takes these new developments as mainly introducing new methods and 
not as redefining psychology as a natural science.22  
 
   Peirce’s classification of the sciences, 1902–1903 (simplified presentation). 
 
 
Peirce’s classification can be seen to bear a certain similarity to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1989) dualistic division 
between sciences based hermeneutically in principles of understanding (Verstehen) and sciences 
founded in principles of explaining according to general laws (Erklären). However, in so far as Peirce’s 
philosophical sciences lay down logical and methodological principles for all specialised sciences, his 
classification still differs significantly from Dilthey’s dualistic scheme. Moreover, his observations of 
developments in the humanities suggest tendencies that cut across Dilthey’s scheme, for example that 
‘[li]nguistics is becoming more and more nomological’ (EP2: 39). In addition, his phenomenology and his 
speculative grammar uncover common experiential and semiotic ground between the two branches of 
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Martin Heidegger’s (2008) and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (2004) than with 
Dilthey’s hermeneutics.  
Despite the dual branching of the specialised empirical sciences, we have noted several 
triapartite divisions in his classification. These tripartite divisions suggest the need to consider his three 
categories more closely and the role of phenomenology in the overall classification.  
 
3.0 Three universal categories: firstness, secondness, thirdness 
The task of Peirce’s most basic philosophical science, phenomenology, is to analyse categories assumed 
to be universal elements in all experiential phenomena. He terms these categories “firstness”, 
“secondness”, and “thirdness”, respectively. While having an historical point of departure in the table of 
categories in Kant’s first Critique,23 Peirce further evokes an Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition by defining 
his categories as “modes of being” (CP 1.23). As modes of being, the categories would constitute the 
ways all phenomena in the world (including ourselves) are. Moreover, as for their foundational role for 
specialized empirical sciences and for metaphysics, the categories would be basic for any 
conceptualization of what scientific theories are about. More indirectly, through defining what a sign is, 
and by informing Peirce’s comprehensive classification of signs,24 the categories are presupposed by any 
logical and scientific thinking, in so far as ‘all thinking is performed in Signs’ (EP2: 447) or ‘is of the 
symbolic nature’ (EP2: 307). Accordingly, his phenomenological analysis of the categories forms the 
backbone of his speculative grammar, which analyses the nature of signs and their meaning. 
Nevertheless, although Peirce’s phenomenology draws on his mathematical logic of relations, his various 
outlines of a phenomenological analysis are rather sketchy and lack the methodological sophistication 




Firstness, in its most general and primary sense, is “what is positively there”, “regardless of what 
is absent”, past and present (EP2: 150). Firstness it is further what is “sole and unique”, involving no 
reference to, or comparison with any other phenomena (EP2: 150). As for its formal simplicity, the 
category is derived from monadic predicates in the mathematical logic of relations (as distinguished from 
dyadic and triadic predicates or relations).25 Both from its formal and experiential sources, its content is 
fixed ahead of any specialised research into psychological correlates of the category, and it is prior to any 
distinctions introduced by other philosophical disciplines. It has thus “pre-logical” status and concerns 
experiential modes of presentation, prior to inquiries into their possible representational or cognitive 
status. Yet, as derived from ordinary experience, the phenomenological analysis provides further 
specifications of firstness in terms of experiential content. Firstness is thus generically qualified as a 
quality of feeling and as encompassing ‘myriad-fold varieties’ of sensory modalities: ‘an odor, say a smell 
of attar, or … one infinite dead ache, [or] the hearing of [a] piercing eternal whistle’ (EP2: 150). By 
emphatically appealing to pre-specialised experience Peirce distinguishes such modes of presentation 
from what psychology would make an object of research.26 On the other hand, like his two other 
categories, firstness defines signs as analysed by speculative grammar.27 
The category secondness is formally derived from the notion of dyadic relations in the 
mathematical logic of relations.28 Abstaining from the latter’s technical specifications, however, Peirce’s 
second category captures a rudimentary idea of a pair of reacting singulars.29 In Peirce’s 
phenomenological analysis, secondness presupposes firstness, but cannot be reduced to firstness.30 
Although Peirce sometimes contrasts secondness to firstness by appealing to experiences of some 
external or “brute force”, his phenomenological analysis is careful not to qualify secondness in terms of a 
physical or material domain as such. One reason for this may be found in the hierarchical order of the 
science classification. Being hierarchically prior to a metaphysics which sustains and justifies a division 
between natural and social science, the phenomenological account of secondness must abstain from 
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using received ontological dichotomies to qualify this category; say, those of body/mind, 
physical/psychological, non-human/human, or effective/final causation. Peirce rather takes resort to 
more intuitive characterizations, such as “an element of struggle”, and he introduces the more abstract 
distinction between agent and patient.31  
Like firstness the second category, too, has a “pre-logical” status and it may be used to define 
forms of sign analyzed by speculative grammar. In particular, secondness defines indices and the 
indexicality of verbal discourse. The category enables separate and step-wise considerations of, for 
example, dyadic and dynamic relations involved by attention raising indices as such (tones of voice);32 
dyadic relations defining cognitive connections established between indices and indicated objects 
(pointing gestures);33 and dyadic relations involved in furnishing verbally mediated information about an 
indicated object (propositional symbols).34 Furthermore, secondness, as well as firstness, provides 
resources for considering non-cognitive and non-linguistic ways in which human agents are embodied in 
the world of experience, and for considering how such embodiment forms a basis for cognitive activity.  
The analysis of thirdness concludes the categorical analysis, and the third category presupposes 
firstness and secondness, but is reducible to neither of the two other categories.35 From a formal point of 
view, Peirce’s derivation of the category from a mathematical logic of relations is intrinsically connected 
to his argument for the irreducibility of triadic relations.36 Since thirdness is ‘further away from common 
sense’ (EP2: 158) a formal approach therefore becomes more salient for analysis of this category. 
Nevertheless, for phenomenology it is crucial that claims concerning the universality and irreducibility of 
the categories can be supported by considerations from ordinary or pre-specialised experience. As for 
the experiential specification of thirdness, Peirce’s science classification leaves certain possibilities open. 
Since all philosophical disciplines are based upon ordinary experience, thirdness could be more indirectly 
analysed and specified through other philosophical disciplines, such as speculative grammar or general 
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metaphysics, or the more specific metaphysical inquiries into principles for natural and social science, 
respectively.  
Firstly, the formal derivation of thirdness provides conceptual input for a definition of what a 
sign is that serves as a starting point for speculative grammar. Peirce explicates the very idea of a sign in 
terms of an irreducible triadic relation between three correlates: a representation (or ‘representamen’), 
the object represented, and the interpretation (or ‘interpretant’) of the representation as representing 
the same object (CP 2.242). He sometimes defines thirdness simply as such a triadic relation.37 His formal 
analysis of various types of triadic relations provides for a general classification of a variety of linguistic 
as well as non-linguistic signs, including the forms of indexicality briefly mentioned above.38 Through this 
sign classification, the three categories gain significance for Peirce’s classification of the sciences as a 
whole. The categories thus inform and enable considerations of signs essential to logic, such as different 
forms of proposition,39 and signs on which specialised scientific observation and theorization would 
depend, such as diagrams,40 as well as types of scientific reasoning distinguished semiotically through 
different kinds of sign ‘interpretants’ as abduction, induction and deduction.41   
Peirce takes the categories, in particular thirdness, to sustain and enable conceptualization and 
theoretization in both natural and social science. In his hierarchical science classification, it is the task of 
metaphysics to apply the categories in exploring general features of reality to provide an ontological 
basis for theoretisation in the specialized disciplines. As for the natural sciences, Peirce stresses that 
metaphysics would be concerned with the ‘reality of Thirdness’ by qualifying the latter in terms of the 
reality of laws or regularities in nature (EP2: 181). Assuming that ‘general principles are really operative 
in nature’ (EP2: 183) his metaphysics thus advocates a version of scholastic realism. By using rather 
simple examples within the reach of ordinary experience, however, he asks what the reality of 
dispositional properties of inorganic things would consist in, such as the hardness of diamond. This 
dispositional property, he argues, cannot be reduced to actual observable states of reacting singular 
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phenomena,42 which would be instances of secondness. Rather, he points out, the reality of a 
dispositional properties proves itself through what would happen under certain conditions. A diamant’s 
hardness thus consists in that the diamond would sustain the pressure of a knife-edge without being 
scratched, if the knife-edge were drawn over it.43   
Peirce’s explorations of thirdness further suggests the relevance of this category for social 
science research. More specifically, in considering the triadic sign-relation, he stresses how the triadic 
relation of the sign (or ‘representamen’) to both an object and an interpretation (‘interpretant’) is 
irreducible. In particular, he qualifies this irreducible triadic relation as an ‘intellectual fact’ (EP2: 171) 
and he states more elaborately that a ‘three-subject fact is comprehensible and is analogous to an 
utterance, a speech’ (CP 6.323, my emphasis). In more specific terms, however, an interpretation of a 
verbal utterance is further defined and conditioned by shared norms and expectations. This is shown by 
Peirce’s example of how acts of asserting and assenting to a proposition are made under a mutual 
understanding that telling a lie would be met with moral, and sometimes legal, sanctions.44 Such 
instances may suggest how language use involves irreducible triadic relations to socially or institutionally 
conditioned interpretations (‘interpretants’), as well as to objects. On the other hand, by neglecting such 
social and normative conditions the analysis would tend to account for sign use in terms of dyadic 
relations defined, for example, by an utterance and some psychological intention behind the former, or, 
alternatively, by a semantic relation between utterance’s verbal meaning and its reference. An even 
more convincing case for the irreducibility of thirdness is provided by Peirce’s example of two persons 
making a contract.45 Such institutionally bounded language use cannot be meaningfully analysed only in 
terms of sets of dyadic relations between reacting singular phenomena specified as, say, a signer and a 
document, between the two parties to a contract, or between the signed document and successive acts 
of the signers. Rather, a triadic relation is defined by the institutionally conditioned intent of the contract 
(interpretant), the contract (sign) and the state of affairs in the world the contract is about and is to 
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regulate (object). Like in an informal act of assertion the signing of a contract is binding on language 
users and has practical consequences if the norms at stake are broken, only that in the case of contracts 
such norms are expressively given through the contract’s intent ‘that certain conditional rules shall 
govern the conduct of [the contractors]’ (CP 1.475). To use a speech act theoretical distinction, in either 
case, language use should be analysed in terms of illocutionary effects, rather than merely as 
perlocutionary effects.46 Like Peirce’s interpretant, illocutionary effects can only be accounted for by 
triadic relations,47 while perlocutionary effects may be analysed as dyadic relations between linguistic 
acts and certain physical, physiological or psychological reactions to those acts. Hence, given these 
specifications, Peirce’s point about the irreducibility of triadic relations and thirdness gains relevance for 
recent developments in the social sciences, such as Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action 
(1984–1987). 
By considering how thirdness defines ontological principles in social and natural science and how 
Peirce’s three categories inform his sign classification, we have noted how the categories gain 
significance for his science classification as a whole. Yet, Peirce further suggests that his categories can 
be applied directly to the divisions between the sciences in qualifying both their distinctness and their 
hierarchical dependence relations. In distinguishing the three main philosophical sciences, he qualifies 
them briefly in terms of firstness, secondness and thirdness, respectively. As for phenomenology, he 
uses the category of firstness in a certain metascientific sense in pointing out that this science treats of 
phenomena ‘in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena … [and] … thus … in 
their Firstness’ (EP2: 197). Moreover, in attempting to qualify both the distinctness of the normative 
sciences and their dependence on phenomenlogy, he uses the category of secondness in an rather 
abstract and highly generalised sense. The normative sciences, he claims, concern ‘the conformity of 
phenomena to ends which are not immanent within those phenomena’ (EP2: 199), and in so far, they 
treat ‘of Phenomena in their Secondness’ (EP2: 197). While admitting that this qualification might be ‘too 
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narrow’ (EP2: 197), his further qualification of metaphysics is in line with our consideration above of its 
relevance for the specialised sciences: ‘Metaphysics … treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness.’ (EP2: 
197). Nevertheless, his use of firstness and secondness in accounting for phenomenology, normative 
science and metaphysics, as well as for metaphysics’ dependence on the two former sciences, may seem 
little convincing compared to his more elaborate attempt to ground both metaphysics and the 
specialised sciences in a sign classification and logical and methodological principles provided by 
speculative grammar, logical critic and methodeutic, respectively. 
However, the categories may also be seen to bear on the subdivisions within each branch of 
specialised science. Peirce classifies the natural and the social sciences hierarchically into nomological, 
classificatory, and descriptive sciences.48 Thirdness informs and sustains the nomological sciences 
through laws or ontological principles for the various fields of natural and social science research, while 
these laws and principles are in turn to provide the basis for classification in the classificatory sciences 
and for possible explanation of phenomena described by descriptive sciences. Yet, through this 
hierarchical order of classification, Peirce deliberatively idealises actual scientific developments and 
tendencies toward theorising laws and regularities. In fact, the hierarchical order reverses the historical 
order of development in so far as there is ‘a well-marked tendency for a science to be first descriptive, 
later classificatory, and lastly to embrace all classes in one law’ (CP 1.226). Moreover, Peirce’s historical 
exemplifications provides opportunity to reflect on the distinctness as well as the historical priority of 
‘classificatory’ and ‘descriptive sciences’ in categorical terms, and in terms of secondness and firstness in 
particular. 
Distinguishing classificatory sciences more carefully, Peirce uses chemistry as example, a science 
he knows from training. Peirce admits that, in its actual state of development, chemistry is little 
concerned with general physical or physio-chemical laws but is ‘limited to the study of reactions, to the 
structure of compounds, and to the behavior of elements in combination’ (CP 1.260). Rather than 
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inquiring deeper into the properties of the different substances, a chemist seeks ‘to identify them and to 
make out their constitutional relations’ (CP 1.260). Hence, in emphasizing concrete reactions and 
behaviors in identifying elements in combinations, Peirce’s account suggests that secondness is an 
underlying category in the chemist’s conceptual and classificatory scheme. Secondness is further the 
defining category in Peirce’s semiotic account of a chemist’s procedures for identifying a particular 
element, using lithium as an example. A chemist identifies this element by using an operational 
definition or a ‘precept’ that ‘tells you what to do in order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the 
object of the word’ (CP 2.330). Since this definition instructs the scientist how (s)he is to interact with 
and manipulate substances in order to identify the element, it works basically like an indexical, which 
Peirce defines in terms of secondness. Hence, using chemistry as a case, Peirce’s distinguishes what 
classificatory sciences are by giving priority to secondness rather than thirdness.  
In Peirce’s hierarchical and Comte-inspired classification, descriptive sciences, such as geology 
and astronomy (CP 1.198), are subordinated to nomological and classificatory sciences. While ‘going into 
the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena’ (EP2: 258) these sciences would endeavor ‘to 
explain their phenomena by the principles of nomological and classificatory physics’ (EP2: 259). This 
hiearchical relationship, however, takes little account of how observational activities distinguish these 
sciences and specialised sciences generally. As Peirce stresses time and again, observational activities not 
only provide an empirical basis for confirmation or refutation of explanatory theories, but is a main 
driver for scientific and theoretical development, and hence for scientific specialisation. What 
distinguishes specialised sciences as such, he points out, is ‘a peculiar form of observation’ (CP 1.99). 
Historically, new technologies of observation have enabled researchers to discover and take account of 
ever more fine grained or complex aspects of micro or macro level phenomena. ‘The great landmarkes in 
the history of science’, he notes, ‘are to be placed at the points of where new instruments, or other 
means of observation, are introduced’ (CP 1.102). One may thus distinguish ‘[a]stronomy before the 
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telescope and astronomy after the telescope. Prephotographic astronomy and photographic astronomy. 
Chemistry before the exact analytic balance, and after’ (CP 1.102). While the phenomenal qualities 
mediated by sophisticated optical technologies are different from those studied by phenomenology 
through everyday life experience, they would still be phenomenal qualities, or, when qualified by 
Peirce’s semiotic distinctions, qualisigns or icons (CP 2.254). In so far, they may be defined in terms of 
firstness. In fact, optical instruments may be specifically designed to capture certain phenomenal 
qualities while ignoring others, as seen, for example, in that ‘the qualities striven for in a telescopic 
objective are of no consequence in a microscopical objective’ (EP2: 131). Moreover, due to particular 
technologies of observation and particular training, a member of certain scientific community, say, ‘a 
bacteriologist’, ‘will live in quite a different world —quite a different aggregate of experience’, than a 
layperson, but also than a member of a different scientific communty, and ‘neither has seen the world in 
which the other lives’ (EP2: 131). Hence, in qualifying specialised sciences in terms of what the 
Husserlean phenomenologist would term “life worldsˮ,49 Peirce suggests that firstness, not only 
secondness and thirdness, may distinguish specialised sciences as such.  
 
4.0 The relevance of Peirce’s classification 
Like Comte, Peirce stresses the unity and interdependence of the sciences, as well as their 
diversifications and their distintinctness. While we have seen how Peirce’s categories of firstness and 
secondness may qualify the distinctness of the various specialised sciences, his category of thirdness, 
through his ‘nomological sciences’, would stress tendencies across the specialised sciences to search for 
general laws and regularies. In particular, we noted that his division between the natural sciences and 
the social or human sciences in effect resists Dilthey’s dualistic scheme in taking account of the fact that 
parts of the humanities, too, are searching for laws or law-like regularities, as in the case of linguistics. In 
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this regard, Peirce’s classification gains relevance in the light of Rens Bod’s (2013) recent comprehensive 
effort to rewrite the history of the humanities.50 Contesting the Diltheyan understanding-explanation 
dichotomy, as well as Wilhelm Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic 
approaches to knowledge, Bod’s study of historical developments across the humanities shows how ‘the 
search for patterns and principles in the humanities is a continuous tradition’ (2013: 7). While Peirce’s 
classification provides sweeping evidence against the Dilthey’s and Windelband’s schemes from the late 
19th century, Bod’s project provides a comprehensive historical account from antiquity up to the present 
that challenges and undermines these schemes. 
As noted above, Peirce’s hierarchical classification most strikingly distinguishes itself from that of 
Comte by including and assigning distinct roles to philosophical disciplines. Peirce’s classification thus 
stresses the unity and interdependencies of the sciences through principles articulated and analysed by 
phenomenology, the normative sciences and metaphysics. Given Peirce’s elaboration of his normative 
sciences more specifically, we may highlight the relevance of this branch of philosophy in particular.  
Although Peirce fails to suggest ethical guidelines for the conduct of research in the 
contemporary sense, he does assign a superordinate role to ethics in relation to all specialised empirical 
sciences. More specifically, in his science classification, ethics informs principles of “self-controlledˮ 
logical reasoning and also, more indirectly, the methodological application of logical reasoning in 
specialised empirical research. More importanly, however, in so far as ethics studies principles of right 
conduct in general and ‘what the fitness of an ideal of conduct consists in’ (1.600), Peirce’s science 
classification would sustain and support a further exploration and specification of ethical norms for the 
conduct of research. Notably, his later proposal to extend the role of the normative sciences to critically 
reflect on our inherited moral beliefs and their applicability to ‘the new world created by science’ (CP 
5.513), seems even more relevant now than in Peirce’s days. In particular, since the objective of this 
critical reflection is to reconsolidate moral beliefs that ‘remain indubitable’ (CP 5.513) such reflection 
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would be congenial to ongoing discussions of how our inherited ideals of human dignity and worth bear 
on current medical and genetic research, stemcell research in particular. 
 Furthermore, Peirce’s semiotic account of logic may be seen to have not only theoretical but 
educational relevance. Through subdividing logic into the semiotic disciplines speculative grammar, 
critical logic and methodeutics, he suggests that all students of science of discovery would benefit from 
considering principles of linguistic or semiotic meaning, logical reasoning and scientific method, ahead of 
disciplinary specialisation. Noting that the medieval trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric) serves as an 
historical model for Peirce’s suggestion (EP2: 327), his semiotic account of logic may be seen to support 
university curriculums that aspire to etablish a common frame of reference for its various specialised 
studies through general courses in philosophy of science, methodology and ethics.51  
The stress on the interdependence of the sciences in Peirce’s classification gains further 
relevance when taken together with his pragmatist view of science as ‘a pursuit of living men’ (CP 1.232) 
and as a ‘living historic entity’ (CP 1.44). As Jaime Nubiola (2005) has pointed out, in several of his 
historical reflections, Peirce considers cross- and interdisciplinarity as a condition for scientific 
development. The hiearchical relationships between nomological, classificatory and descriptive sciences 
in his classification may thus translate more dynamically into influences, loans and interactions between 
sciences. For example, Peirce thinks that those who study ‘different kinds of plants and animals cannot 
attain any true understanding of taxonomic biology until they can be guided by the discoveries of the 
physiologists’ (CP 1.226). In turn, ‘the physiologist may be aided’ by facts collected by taxonomic 
biologists (CP 1.226). Moreover, significant scientific developments have been achieved through 
interaction between the various disciplines and fields of research: ‘Darwin adapted to biology the 
methods of Malthus and the economists; Maxwell adapted to … electricity the methods of 
hydrodynamics … Wundt adapts to psychology the methods of physiology; … Cournot adapted to 
political economy the calculus of variations’ (EP1: 212). Extrapolating from these historical cases, Peirce 
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ponders that, in the future, major advances will come from cross-disciplinary uptakes through which one 
succeeds ‘in adapting the methods of one science to the investigation of another’ (EP1: 212). In line with 
this hypothesised trajectory, we may briefly note how comprehensive research fields have emerged 
through cross- or interdisciplinary uptakes in the 20th century, such as biochemistry, cellular biology and 
ecology in the natural sciences; neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology and social psychology in 
psychology; and socio-linguistics, gender studies, digital and environmental humanities in the social 
science and the humanities. In particular, Peirce could be seen to anticipate the emergence of the 
interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS) in stipulating ‘ethnology of technology’ 
(EP2: 261) as part of ethnology. Some such developments would challenge his dual branching of the 
specialised sciences, in particular developments involving not only of uptakes of methods but theories 
from other disciplines. Obvious examples would be evolutionary psychology and neuropsychology, which 
would have to be taken as natural science disciplines in Peirce’s classification, rather than as 
psychological disciplines proper. 
At times Peirce stresses a kind of interdisciplinary interaction that bridges as well as challenges 
one overarching division in his classification: the division between science of discovery and practical 
science. New scientific developments may start, he points out, not only through implementation of new 
technologies, but through influences from practical sciences and practical life. Such influences are not 
driven by ‘reason or principle’ but by ‘dynamical relations’ or ‘a compulsive quality of action’ (CP 7.52). 
Interdisciplinary efforts are urged in response to some practical problem: ‘one group may stimulate 
another by demanding the solution of some problem’ (CP 7.52). ‘In this way’, he maintains, ‘the practical 
sciences incessantly egg on researches into theory’ (CP 7.52). This interdisciplinarity, he suggests, does 
not consist simply in practical adaptations or applications of scientific theories but in theory 
development in response to some major practical or social challenge. In so far, Peirce could be seen to 
anticipate the conceptualisation of what Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny et al (1994) and Nowotny, Scott 
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and Gibbons (2001) have qualified as the production of ‘Mode 2’ knowledge: knowledge that is 
transdisciplinary, rather than disciplinary; socially distributed across various sectors of society, and 
developed in contexts of application and use. Recalling also, however, that Peirce urges for his normative 
sciences to address social challenges arising from the applications of science and technology (CP. 5.513), 
his science classification and pragmatism generally would call for cooperation across theoretical and 
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